In the field of issues management, it’s common knowledge that some corporations now “partner” with NGOs on various issues of “social concern.” That term “social concern” is often one that is defined by the NGO, rather than the corporation, by the way. So now, instead of an NGO and a corporation fighting tooth and nail over an environmental issue, for example, they work together toward a “common goal.” Okay. That seems all warm and fuzzy, on the surface. But let’s dig a little deeper into the nature of this “partnership.”
In a situation like this, what’s that “common goal?” For the NGO, the goal would be the achievement of, perhaps, a social agenda objective that they have pursued for years, often via an adversarial relationship with the corporation. For the corporation, what’s the goal? What motivates the corporation to take on such a “strange bedfellows” relationship? Well, as a recent article in the Christian Science Monitor commented, corporations often approach NGOs to partner on a common project so that those same NGOs don’t turn around in the future and spread bad press about the corporation. A “common goal?” Seems more like a protection racket.
Imagine this scenario. Corporation X is concerned that future bad press could negatively impact their expected future revenues. So, to preclude the threat of negative press, an implicit threat at least, the brass at X dial up their historical foes at NGO Z and play let’s make a deal. The brass over at Z aren’t going to say, “Hey X, thanks for calling, but no thanks.” No. Z’s ship just came in. The pressure that the folks at NGO Z have been applying to Corporation X all of these years has just paid off.
Didn’t I see a scene something like this in at least one episode of The Sopranos?
Now, when the NGOs and the corporations get together like this, at least according to the previously mentioned Christian Science Monitor article, no money changes hands. The article stated that the NGO doesn’t receive any fees from the corporate partner. But isn’t there an exchange of value here? Isn’t this somewhat like a scene from The Sopranos? Let’s look at it this way.
The Sopranos Example – Paulie, grey slicked-back side wings and all, goes into a shop and “tells” the proprietor that the shop could “have some trouble” in the future. This “implicit threat” means that the shopkeeper might lose some of his or her “expected future revenues.” But, Paulie and his problem-resolution specialists can “protect” the shop and make that trouble “disappear,” for some consideration of course. In this Sopranos example, that consideration is money.
Paulie and his problem-resolution specialists get what they were looking for, i.e., they reach their direct objective. The shopkeeper avoids that “implicit threat” and gets to keep his or her future revenue stream.
The NGO Z/Corporation X Collaboration Example – The presence of NGO Z represents an “implicit threat” to Corporation X, the threat of future negative publicity. Corporation Z recognizes that this “trouble” is possible. The presence of this “implicit threat” means that Corporation X might lose some of their “expected future revenues.” But, the problem-resolution specialists of Corporation X realize they can “protect” the corporation and make that problem “disappear,” for some consideration exchanged of course. In this NGO Z/Corporation X example that consideration is collaborating with NGO Z to allow NGO Z to achieve one of their social agenda objectives.
The Corporation Z problem-resolution specialists get what they were looking for, i.e., they get to keep their future revenue stream. NGO Z gets what they were looking for, i.e., they achieve their direct objective of “social concern,” which, of course, is defined by them.
Weird, isn’t it?
And once this “partnership” is established, where is the line drawn? How far does this relationship go?
In The Sopranos Example, Paulie keeps returning to the shopkeeper saying there are always “other” troubles on the horizon and that an increased payment is needed to keep those troubles away.
In The NGO Z/Corporation X Collaboration Example, the management of Corporation X realizes that there is always the possibility that NGO Z could spread bad press, regardless of how much or how well they work together on any selected project. What happens after that project is complete? Corporation X knows that NGO Z will always have “other” future projects of “social concern” on their horizon.
Are these NGO/corporate collaborations a good way to run a company?
How far does it go?
Slacktivism is a way for people to make themselves feel like they are advocating for a social cause, while actually committing little or no time or money to the effort. It’s, for the most part, a feel-good activity. Not only does slacktivism make individuals feel good about themselves when they sign up to be a friend, fan, or follower on the page of a cause’s website or social network or Twitter page, but the act of slacktivism impresses others with the individual’s “social awareness.” That impression, of which the individual is aware, further adds to the individual’s ego gratification.
To go along to get along with this trend, multi-national corporations (MNCs) are moving, seemingly together as if in lock step, to establish corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs in order to meet the demands and expectations of NGOs, whether it be on environmental, social, labor, or cultural issues. And to help them craft their CSRs, MNCs now regularly collaborate with NGOs, bringing NGOs to the table as trusted advisors and de facto consultants. And when MNCs do this, which is increasingly often, they seem to do it with a “mea culpa” attitude.
From pages 148 to 149 Paul presents an interesting concept: that there will be an increase in activism because of the Baby Boom. He doesn’t say it in quite this way, but he does say that because of the aging of the U.S. population that there will be a decrease in the number of employees working for the American government. Paul hypothesizes, from the perspective of the publication year of 2005, that these retiring employees would likely not be replaced at a rate that would equal the attrition. The reason he gives is that government employment is not as attractive as that in the private sector, and that because of this handicap the attrition rate may exceed the replacement rate.
Per an article at 
She raises the question of how reliable that information will be if it’s brought to you by a paid “digital butler” rather than a trusted friend. Touché, Judy. That’s the essence of the social web. To have information passed to you by that friend you’ve come to trust. Not a digital butler than does your mercenaric bidding.
